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The influence of CEO Demographic Characteristics on Corporate 
Risk -Taking: Evidence from Chinese IPOs 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the influence of CEOs’ demographic characteristics (e.g. age, board 
experience, professional experience, education and gender) on corporate risk-taking for a 
sample of 892 IPOs floated in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Using fixed 
effects and system GMM models we find that younger and shorter tenured CEOs and those 
with postgraduate qualifications are more likely to consider risky decisions. We also find a 
highly significant and positive relationship between CEO previous board experience and 
corporate risk-taking. Interestingly and consistent with the recent literature, we find that 
female CEOs are not risk averse compared with their male counterparts. Moreover, we find 
that corporate risk-taking is higher the greater the proportion of state-ownership. Finally, our 
study may provide useful insights to shareholders as they generally seek to hire the most 
talented CEOs with the relevant set of skills to achieve shareholders’ objectives and improve 
the Chinese competitiveness in the global market. 
 
Key words: CEO characteristics; corporate risk- taking; corporate governance; Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs); China. 
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The influence of CEO Demographic Characteristics on Corporate 
Risk -Taking: Evidence from Chinese IPOs 
 
1. Introduction 
Management quality has direct implications for corporate risk-taking and the decision making 
process (Li and Tang 2010; Sanders and Hambrick 2007). We believe that stock markets 
continually reflect the assessment of management quality including CEOs’ demographic 
characteristics into stock prices. For instance, skilled and qualified CEOs may substantially 
reduce the uncertainty about management quality and this has implications for stock prices 
(Pan et al. 2013).  
 
The existing body of the literature largely investigates the impact of CEOs’ characteristics on 
corporate governance, R&D spending, acquisition and divestitures, the launch of innovative 
products, cash holdings and financial performance; see for example Hoskisson et al (1993); 
Sanders (2001); Barker and Mueller (2002); Greve (2003) ; Nelson (2005); Brookman and 
Thistle (2009); and Orens and Reheul (2013).  In China, the literature mainly investigates the 
impact of CEO hubris on corporate takeover decisions (Li and Tang, 2010).  We argue that 
CEOs’ demographic characteristics are the main determinant of their hubris and 
overconfidence and this has implications for corporate risk-taking. Therefore, in this paper, 
we focus on CEOs’ demographic characteristics and their impact on corporate risk- taking in 
China. 
 
China has an increasing influence on the world economy although it has different socio-
economic and cultural frameworks compared with western countries. Despite the global 
financial crisis, the Chinese economy has grown at a steady rate over the past few years; 
9.3%, 7.8% and 7.7% in 2011, 2012, and 2013 respectively. Despite the weak legal system 
4 
 
and considerable proportion of non-tradable shares among listed firms, there were a total of 
873 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) made in China over the period 1994 - 2001. Moreover, 
there was a remarkable growth in the IPO market over the period 2001-2008 so that a total of 
RMB 508.6 billion was raised and around 414 IPOs were launched
1
; therefore, China was 
declared the top country in the world in terms of the number of IPO new issues in 2007  (Xu 
and Oh, 2011). The momentum of IPO growth continued as RMB 103.4 billion and 183.1 
billion were raised during 2008 and 2009 respectively. Surprisingly, in 2012 the IPO market 
witnessed a massive decline with funds raised down by more than 62% compared with 2011. 
Therefore, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) restricted the approval of 
new IPOs in October 2012 due to concerns that new share offerings would further damage 
the market
2
.  
 
Therefore, it is interesting to understand the main characteristics of IPOs’ boards and the 
demographic characteristics of their CEOs in particular. We agree with Boone et al (2007) 
and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) that there are several advantages of studying IPOs’ board 
characteristics. Firstly, the vast majority of the literature investigates well established 
companies and limited research has been carried out using IPOs. Secondly, the evolution of 
corporate boards can be monitored over time since the IPO year. Thirdly and most 
importantly, studying board characteristics around the time of the public offering is a 
particularly rich setting as usually IPOs are subject to significant changes with respect to the 
governance mechanisms (Baker and Gompers, 2003). Finally, IPOs are expected to adopt 
more value-maximising governance features compared with already listed companies 
(Gertner and Kaplan, 1996). Therefore, we believe that studying CEO demographic 
characteristics of the Chinese IPOs and their influence on corporate risk- taking is timely and 
may offer new insights to the literature in this area.  
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The main objective of this paper is to investigate the influence of the CEOs’ demographic 
characteristics (e,g, age, board experience, professional experience, education, and gender) on 
corporate risk- taking. Using a sample of 892 IPOs floated in both the SSE and SZSE during 
1999-2012, we find a negative and significant relationship between both CEO age and tenure 
and corporate risk- taking. However,we find a positive and significant relationship between 
both CEO higher education and their previous board experience and corporate risk- taking. 
Interestingly, and consistent with the findings of Berger et al (2012), and Adams and Funk 
(2012), we find that female CEOs are not risk averse.  
Our paper has several incremental contributions; firstly, in addition to the influence of CEO 
gender, we investigate the broader concept of diversity including age, board experience, 
professional experience and education. Secondly, our paper is– to the best to our knowledge- 
the first to investigate the influence of CEOs’ demographic characteristics and corporate risk-
taking in China. Moreover, our study contributes to the IPO literature as it is the first to 
investigate the influence of CEO demographics on risk- taking for IPOs.  Our study may 
provide useful insights to shareholders as they generally seek to hire the most talented CEOs 
with the relevant set of skills to achieve shareholders’ objectives and improve Chinese 
competitiveness in the global market. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  
The next section discusses the literature review and hypotheses development. Sections 3 and 
4 present a description of our dataset and the empirical modelling respectively. Section 5 
presents the results of our empirical analysis and finally, section 6 summarises and concludes.  
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Theoretical perspectives 
There are a number of theoretical perspectives with respect to CEO characteristics including 
upper echelons theory, resource dependence theory and human capital theory. The upper 
echelons theory states that “organizational outcomes-strategic choices and performance 
levels-are partially predicted by managerial background characteristics” (Hambrick and 
Mason 1984). Directors’ experience, values and characteristics have an influence on their 
perceptions and hence their decisions; this is the main premise of the upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick, 2007). 
 
Drawing on the upper echelons theory, we argue that CEOs, amongst other decision makers 
are characterized by bounded rationality. This means that CEOs make decisions based on 
their social, behavioural and psychological characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Orens 
and Reheul 2013). The latter argue that CEOs’ demographic characteristics e.g. education, 
age, tenure and professional experience might be used as a proxy for their psychological 
characteristics. The upper echelons theory also assumes that CEOs’ discretion is largely 
influenced by cognitive, psychological and social factors. A number of studies have drawn on 
the upper echelons theory to explain the CEOs’ demographic characteristics in relation to 
cash holdings behaviour (Orens and Reheul 2013); corporate takeover decisions (Li and Tang 
2010); innovation (Kitchell 1997); R&D spending (Barker and Mueller 2002); and financial 
disclosure (Bamber et al, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, the resource dependence theory provides the basis and the theoretical 
argument with respect to board diversity. Board directors link their companies with external 
organisations and this help improve companies legitimacy and facilitate their access to 
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resources e.g. information, expertise, communication (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 and Carter 
et al, 2010). Therefore, different types of directors may bring to their companies different 
resources, hence more diverse boards are likely to bring to their companies different sets of 
intangible resources (Hillman et al., 2000). We argue that different CEO characteristics 
including gender and education bring to the board different perspectives, experience and 
backgrounds; therefore, the presence of women directors on the board, for instance, brings 
different benefits and resources to the company (Carter et al, 2010).  
 
Terjesen et al (2009), using the human capital theory of Becker (1964), argue that 
individual’s education, skills and experience frame their cognition and productivity and hence 
benefit the overall company. Therefore, according to the human capital theory, different types 
of directors or different human capital may bring different backgrounds and different 
experiences to the board (Hillman et al, 2000). We argue that more diverse boards may have 
better ability and better management quality which help the company to address different 
environmental dependencies. Moreover, Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) state that female 
directors bring forward new opinions and perspectives that would not otherwise be 
demonstrated if the boards were homogeneous. Hillman and Dalziel (2003), drawing on 
agency theory, argue that to better exercise the monitoring role, boards should include an 
appropriate mix of experience and backgrounds in order to effectively evaluate management 
and assess business strategies. 
 
2.2 CEO demographic characteristics 
There has been an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the influence of CEO 
characteristics on corporate risk- taking proxies. Lin et al (2011) find a positive relationship 
between CEO characteristics (e.g. education, political connections, and professional 
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experience) and the innovation in private companies in China. Clayton et al (2005) find an 
increase in stock return volatility around CEO turnovers. Li and Tang (2010) using survey 
data from 2,790 CEOs of manufacturing companies in China find a positive relationship 
between CEO hubris and company risk- taking. They define CEO hubris as a CEO’s 
exaggerated self-confidence. Hiller and Hambrick (2005), find that CEO overconfidence may 
lead to faster, less comprehensive, and more centralised decisions. Similarly, Simon and 
Houghton (2003) find a positive relationship between directors’ overconfidence and 
corporate risk- taking.  
 
Using psychometric tests Graham et al (2013) investigate the differences in CEO risk 
aversion and optimism and find that US CEOs differ significantly from non-US CEOs in 
terms of their underlying attitudes.  They also find that the more the risk-tolerance of CEOs 
the more mergers and acquisitions initiated by their companies. Moreover, they find that 
more optimistic CEOs rely particularly on short-term debt. Nicolosi (2013) finds that higher 
dividend yields are associated with married, Republican, Christian CEOs. Kaplan et al (2012) 
find that CEOs’ general ability e.g. interpersonal-related skills are the key determinants for 
subsequent success in a buyout.  Malmendier et al (2011) find that CEOs with military 
experience follow a more aggressive strategy and prefer high leverage. Moreover, CEOs who 
grew up during the Great Depression period are more risk averse as they rely more on 
internal sources of finance.  
2.2.1 CEO age 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) claim that older CEOs adopt less aggressive investment 
strategies and rely on traditional management styles. Orens and Reheul (2013) argue that, 
according to the upper echelons theory, older CEOs are more risk averse and conservative 
than younger CEOs. Therefore they are more likely to undertake corporate decisions which 
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are not aligned with the interests of shareholders. Furthermore, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
claim that older CEOs may have greater influence over the board. Therefore, their experience 
and knowledge may allow them to exert power over the board of directors and accordingly to 
take less risky decisions. Hence older CEOs may be seen as more conservative (Hambrick 
and Mason 1984) and risk-averse (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986) as they follow 
defensive rather than offensive strategies (Child 1974).  
 
Equally, Graham et al (2013) find that younger CEOs are risk-tolerant and usually run fast 
growth companies. Beber and Fabbri (2012) argue that younger CEOs may focus on short 
term objectives in the hope of building their reputation. Therefore, they may take more risk 
compared with older CEOs. Barker and Mueller (2002) find that the younger the CEOs the 
greater the R&D spending. Yim (2013) finds that there is a negative link between CEO age 
and corporate acquisitions. Moreover, he finds no impact of CEO age on company’s growth 
and capital expenditures. The above discussion suggests that older CEOs may prefer not to 
make risky decisions compared with younger CEOs who may be more inclined to make 
riskier decisions. Therefore older CEOs are more likely to undertake corporate decisions 
which are not aligned with the interests of shareholders and hence, we hypothesise the 
following: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between CEO age and corporate risk- taking. 
 
2.2.2 CEO board experience 
Chen and Zheng (2014) argue that longer-tenured CEOs may imply greater managerial power 
and entrenchment. An entrenched CEO may enjoy other benefits e.g. more control; therefore 
they might be less motivated to make risky decisions (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; John 
et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Chen and Zheng, 2014). Grimm and Smith (1991) find 
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a negative relationship between CEO tenure and changes in the company’s strategy. This 
suggests that CEOs with a longer tenure might be seen as more committed to their plans and 
their views on how the company should be run (Hambrick and Fukutomi 1991). Moreover, 
the longer the CEO tenure the less likelihood of implementing changes as their job novelty 
may decrease and hence they may not have the required responses and reactions to changes in 
the external environment (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991 and Miller, 1991). Orens and 
Reheul (2013) argue that newly appointed CEOs are more likely to consider risky alternatives 
as they are externally focused and much more receptive to new business ideas compared with 
longer tenured CEOs. However, longer tenured CEOs have the ability- through their personal 
relationships - to influence directors’ selection compared with shorter-tenured CEOs 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). Moreover, stakeholders believe that longer-tenured CEOs 
add to the company legitimacy (Orens and Reheul 2013). 
 
On the other hand, Anderson et al (2011) argue that directors’ decision making is influenced 
by the time spent serving as both a director on their company’s board of directors and also as 
a director on other boards. They also argue that CEOs’ previous board experience enables 
them to better understand corporate culture and group dynamics. Koellinger (2008) claims 
that CEOs with previous board experience have broader perspectives and are much more 
open to encourage innovative and risky ideas. Orens and Reheul (2013) argue that CEO 
experience expands their networks and this may improve their awareness of the most recent 
developments in business ideas. Finally, Anderson et al (2011) claim that previous board 
experience can be used as a proxy for directors’ reputation and marketability in the job 
market.  
Based on the above discussion, we argue, following Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) and 
Thomas et al (1991) that longer-tenured CEOs might be more interested in the stability and 
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efficiency of their companies as they have served on the board for a longer term and therefore 
may be less willing to make strategic decisions and hence may not take risky decisions. 
Therefore, we expect that there might be a negative relationship between CEO tenure and 
corporate risk- taking. Moreover, we argue that CEOs with previous board experience 
provides them with different perspectives with respect to innovative business ideas and 
strategic decisions.  Therefore, we expect that CEOs with previous board experience are 
likely to make more risky decisions and hence we formulate our second and third hypotheses 
as follows: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between CEO tenure and corporate risk- taking.  
H3: There is a positive relationship between CEO previous board experience and corporate 
risk- taking. 
 
2.2.3 CEO professional experience 
Professional experience provides CEOs with a clearer vision and knowledge of the external 
environment of the company including its customers and suppliers, in addition to corporate 
regulations (Anderson et al., 2011). This enables CEOs to evaluate potential investment 
opportunities through the trade-off between risk and return (Orens and Reheul 2013). 
Professionally experienced CEOs are also more likely to have a better perception of company 
problems and this may enhance the communication and co-ordination in the company, thus 
facilitating better decision making. Herrmann and Datta (2006) argue that professional 
experience is one of the main determinants of CEOs’ ability to make strategic decisions.  
Lin et al (2011) find a positive relationship between CEOs’ professional background and 
private companies’ innovation in China. CEOs professional experience has implications for 
their decisions, e.g. CEOs with Law backgrounds may have a better perception of legal 
aspects and regulations. Moreover, CEOs with Accounting backgrounds are more 
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knowledgeable about financial issues. This may enable CEOs to better communicate their 
viewpoint with other directors and related parties and this enhances the monitoring and 
advising roles to other directors (Anderson et al., 2011). Furthermore, Barker and Mueller 
(2002) find that CEOs’ professional experience (in particular Marketing and/or Engineering) 
is positively related to R&D spending. We argue that CEOs’ professional experience may 
bring to the board a pool of knowledge and expertise. Moreover, CEOs’ professional 
experience enables them to be more self-confident, innovative and more open-minded to new 
business ideas and thus they are likely to be less risk averse compared with less 
professionally experienced CEOs. The literature on professional experience provides 
inconclusive results with respect to the influence of different professional backgrounds 
(Science, Engineering, Accounting, Finance, Economics, Marketing and Law) on corporate 
risk-taking.  Therefore, we formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H4: Corporate risk-taking is associated with CEO’s professional experience. 
 
2.2.4 CEO education 
Anderson et al (2011) argue that different educational backgrounds (level of education e.g. 
postgraduate studies) may bring into the board different viewpoints, perspectives, cognitive 
paradigms, and different professional development. The literature on CEO education finds 
inconclusive results. Thomas et al (1991) and Barker and Mueller (2002) argue that highly 
educated CEOs are likely to lead more innovative companies. Orens and Reheul (2013) claim 
that, in addition to their psychological and social characteristics, CEOs’ decisions reflect their 
education. They also find that highly educated CEOs are likely to be less risk averse, open-
minded to new innovative business ideas and better informed about their external 
environment. Beber and Fabbri (2012) find that overconfident directors with an MBA degree 
may be willing to take more risk. Lin et al (2011) find a positive relationship between CEO’s 
educational background and private companies’ innovation in China.  Barker and Mueller 
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(2002) find that CEOs with an advanced science degree are less risk averse and more likely to 
invest in R&D. Moreover, Tyler and Steensma (1998) argue that CEOs with advanced 
Science and Engineering degrees have better risk- taking skills. 
 
On the other hand, Daellenbach et al (1999) did not find any significant relationship between 
CEO education and the level of R&D spending. Although the literature on CEOs’ education 
provides mixed results, the main theme of the findings suggests that CEOs with postgraduate 
studies are likely to be more innovative and have better risk- taking skills. Therefore, we 
hypothesise the following: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between CEO education and corporate risk- taking. 
 
2.2.5 CEO gender 
The resource dependence theory assumes that female directors bring to the board different 
perspectives and experience. The existing body of the literature documents that female 
directors are more risk averse. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) and Sunden and Surette 
(1998) argue that the perception that women are less risk averse than men may explain the 
low proportion of females sitting on banks’ boards. Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) find 
that companies with more gender diverse boards were less involved in sub-prime lending. 
Mateos et al (2012) argue that this stereotype of risk averse female directors is the main 
reason for the “Glass Ceiling” on the corporate promotion ladder. Graham et al (2013) find 
that female CEOs are less likely to have higher leverage ratios compared with their male 
counterparts. Similarly, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female CEOs are less likely to 
rely on long-term debt and to undertake acquisitions. They also find that female CEOs are 
likely to exercise stock options early compared with male CEOs and this suggests that male 
CEOs are more overconfident with respect to corporate decisions. 
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On the other hand, Berger et al (2012) find that a higher proportion of female board members 
is associated with an increase in risk-taking. Adams and Funk (2012) find that female 
directors are more benevolent and universally concerned but less power-oriented than their 
male counterparts. More importantly, they find that female directors are more risk-loving 
than male directors. Thus, having a woman on the board may not lead to more risk-averse 
decision-making (Adams and Funk 2012).  The above discussion shows that there is a large 
strand in the existing literature which supports the negative association between the presence 
of female directors (including CEOs) and corporate risk-taking. Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no other studies that investigate the impact of CEO gender on corporate 
risk- taking in China. Based on the above discussion we formulate our sixth hypothesis:  
H6: There is a negative relationship between the presence of female CEOs and corporate 
risk- taking. 
 
3. Data and sample 
We collect data on corporate risk- taking, CEO characteristics, corporate governance, and 
other company specific variables for a sample of Chinese non-financial IPOs floated in the 
SSE and SZSE over the period 1999-2009. We track the changes in both CEO characteristics 
and corporate risk- taking measures over at least 4 years post IPO e.g if the company was 
floated in 2009, we then collect data on all sample firms until 2012 i.e. at the IPO year, IPO 
year+1, IPO year+2, and IPO year+3.  In line with other studies (e.g., Peasnell et al, 2005; 
Anderson et al, 2011), we exclude companies in the financial sector as they have different 
governance characteristics and a different regulatory framework. Therefore, our final sample 
is an unbalanced panel that comprises 892 IPOs and 8006 company-year observations. Data 
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is collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database 
which is designed and developed by GTA Information Technology Corporation. 
In China, the title of CEO was rarely used but companies have started to use it more recently.  
The most common titles that are historically used by Chinese companies are Chairman and 
General Manager. We agree with Xiao et al (2004); Wang (2010); Firth et al (2009); Fan et al 
(2007); Chang and Wong (2009); and Pessarossi and Weill (2013) among others that the 
general manager is the company’s “top executive” who is equivalent to “Chief Executive 
Officer” (CEO) in Western countries3.  
 
3.1 Corporate risk- taking measures 
Prior studies have used different proxies for risk- taking including R&D intensity, innovation, 
and acquisitions and takeovers
4
. However following Anderson and Fraser (2000); Pathan 
(2009) and Low (2009), we estimate three different measures of corporate risk- taking 
namely total risk, company specific risk (unsystematic) and systematic risk. Total risk 
captures the overall variability in stock return and reflects the market perception about the 
company’s financial position (Pathan 2009). Total risk is calculated using the annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock returns for each year. Daily stock returns are calculated as 
the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading 
days adjusted for dividends, stock dividends, and stock splits. We also calculate company 
specific risk (unsystematic) for each company- year. Company specific risk (unsystematic) is 
unique and related to their operating activities. We measure company specific risk as the 
annualised standard deviation of the daily abnormal returns generated by the market model 
and market adjusted model (as a robustness check) for each year. We use both SSE and SZSE 
composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
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stock exchanges respectively. Finally, we calculate systematic risk as the difference between 
total risk and company specific risk. 
 
3.2 CEO characteristics  
We collect data on CEO characteristics namely age, board experience, professional 
experience, education, and gender. We identify CEO age and gender for each company over 
the sample period. Board experience takes into account the length of time served on the 
current board (tenure). We also use previous boards’ memberships as another proxy for CEO 
board experience by specifying a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has 
previous board memberships and 0 otherwise. To measure CEO education, we create a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a CEO holds a postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters 
and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise.  
 
Moreover, we collect data on professional experience and classify the professional 
backgrounds of CEOs into three main categories
5
 namely, Science/Engineering, 
Economics/Accounting and Law following Anderson et al (2011). Therefore, we create 
dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a CEO has a respective background in the relevant 
professional category and 0 otherwise. Finally, we create a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a CEO has a political background and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.3 Corporate governance characteristics 
We collect data on governance characteristics of the Chinese IPOs. These include board size, 
board independence, and ownership structure. Board size is measured by the total number of 
directors sitting on the board of directors (BoD). We measure board independence by the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) sitting on the BoD. Hillman et al 
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(2000) find that board structure (measured by size and independence) reduces company 
uncertainty when directors link the company with its external environment.  Moreover, we 
measure CEO/chair duality as defined by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 where 
the roles of the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person and 0 otherwise. We 
believe that combining the roles of CEO and Chair might be seen as an indication of power 
vested in a single individual.  
 
Despite the economic reform and privatisation of many state-owned companies, the state still 
owns a majority of controlling shareholdings in Chinese listed companies (Sun and Tong 
2003). This may have an impact on CEO discretion and thus corporate risk- taking (Li and 
Tang 2010). Therefore, we control for the ownership structure as measured by the proportion 
of state-owned shares. Chang and Wong (2009) claim that either the central or provincial 
government in China appoints senior directors including the CEO; whilst Li and Tang (2010) 
claim that the government also appoints the CEOs of non-state-owned companies to ensure 
their compliance with government policies (Li and Tang 2010). On the other hand, Barker 
and Mueller (2002) and May (1995) argue that the greater the CEO share ownership, the 
more risky the decisions they undertake.  Therefore, we measure CEO share ownership
6
 by 
the proportion of shares owned by the CEO and expect that corporate risk- taking is higher in 
companies where CEOs have significant share ownership.  
 
3.4 Company specific variables 
We control for the financial performance of IPOs using both lagged return on assets (ROA) 
and lagged values of Tobin’s Q (market value of equity, the book value of debt and the book 
value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets). We expect a positive 
relationship between lagged financial performance and corporate risk- taking. We also 
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construct a number of company-specific variables which are the primary determinants of 
corporate risk- taking. We use companies’ lagged total assets as a proxy for size. We also use 
lagged total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage. Moreover, we control for 
company age defined as the number of years since the IPO. We also control for the lagged 
ratio of intangible assets to total assets as a proxy for fast growth companies. Finally, we 
create a set of industry, stock exchange (SSE and SZSE) and year dummies to control for any 
potential inter-industry, listing exchange and time specific effects.   
 
4. Empirical Modelling 
Endogeneity may bias the estimation results and lead to spurious correlations due to the 
omitted unobservable company characteristics e.g. corporate culture, norms and management 
quality which are assumed to be time-invariant during the period of study (Adams and 
Ferreira 2009). To investigate the impact of CEO demographic characteristics on corporate 
risk- taking for the Chinese IPOs, we use a fixed effects model to control for company 
heterogeneity and any other unobservable company characteristics that may influence the 
results
7
. The advantage of a fixed effects model is that it controls for the potential omitted 
company characteristics that may lead to inconsistent estimation due to endogeneity issues.   
 
However there is another source of endogeneity, namely reverse causality. In our empirical 
estimation, there might be a reverse causality between corporate risk- taking and board 
structure. Moreover, there might be a reverse causality between ownership structure and 
corporate risk- taking (Low 2009; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Demsetz and Lehn 1985).  
Therefore as a robustness test and following Low (2009), we estimate the dynamic panel data 
model of Blundell and Bond (1998) namely the system Generalized Method of Moments 
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(GMM) estimator which combines in a system the equation in first-differences with the same 
equation expressed in levels
8
 as in equation 1. 
     ititiitiitiitiit vYearxCEOCCRTCRT    ''10              (1)    
Where, itCRT is the corporate risk-taking measures; 1itCRT : is the lagged measures of 
corporate risk- taking ; itCEOC is a k*1 vector of CEOs’ characteristics, itx  is a k*1 vector 
of corporate governance characteristics; financial performance; share ownership and other 
control variables in addition to company-and industry -specific effects. '  and '  are a k*1
vector of parameters to be estimated, iv  is the panel unobservable heterogeneity (which may 
be correlated with the covariates), and 
it  is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
over the whole sample with variance 2 . iv  and it  are assumed to be independent for each i 
over all t. We use lagged levels instruments for the regression in differences, and lags of the 
first-differenced variables for the equation in levels. Therefore, we use 4 lags of board size, 
board independence, CEO ownership and state ownership as instruments in the equation in 
first-differences, and 3 lags of their differences as instruments in the equation in levels. For 
all regression models, we control for time fixed effects and estimate clustered standard errors 
using the Windmeijer (2005) correction procedures to produce robust standard errors. 
 
We argue that our study is less subject to selection bias due to the CSRC regulation - in 
particular article 12 in which there should not be significant change in the directors and 
senior management team of the issuer in the three years prior to an IPO
9
. Therefore, the 
reverse causality between directors’ characteristics and risk taking behavior is unlikely in our 
paper. 
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5. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Table 1 illustrates that the mean value of total risk measured by the annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock returns is 70% while the average company specific risk measured by 
the annualized standard deviations of excess returns is 64%. Table 1 also shows that the mean 
value of systematic risk measured by the difference between total risk and company specific 
risk is 7%. 
 
CEO age ranges from 24 to 77 years with a mean value of 47 years. CEO tenure ranges from 
1 to 20 years with a mean value of 3.3 years. Moreover, 41% of the CEOs in our sample have 
previous board memberships. Table 1 also illustrates the professional background of the 
Chinese CEOs as 37% have a Science/Engineering background while 23% have an 
Economics/Accounting background. Table 1 also illustrates that 6% of CEOs have political 
backgrounds. Moreover, the average CEOs’ share ownership is 2% with a maximum 
shareholding of 69%, while state ownership has a maximum shareholding of 86% with a 
mean value of 22%. 
 
Furthermore, Table 1 presents the governance characteristics of the Chinese IPOs’ boards of 
directors. The mean value of female CEOs is 5% while the chair and CEO roles are 
conducted by the same person in 17% of the Chinese IPOs. Board size ranges from 5 to 19 
directors with a mean value of 9.4 directors with the percentage of INEDs being 33%. The 
average ROA and Tobin’s Q are 7% and 1.8 respectively whereas the average company size, 
proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, being 21.48 (2130 million RMB). Finally, 
59% of IPOs are floated in the SSE while 41 % of IPOs are floated in the SZSE.  
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Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 presents a comparison between CEO demographics, corporate governance 
characteristics and other control variables for IPOs floated in the SSE and the SZSE and for 
state –owned and non-state-owned IPOs. We notice that there is a significant difference at the 
1% level between corporate risk- taking measures between SSE and the SZSE and between 
state owned and non –state owned IPOs. Table 2 also shows that both total risk and company 
specific risk are greater in the SZSE, however systematic risk is higher in the SSE. On the 
other hand, corporate risk- taking measures are higher for state-owned IPOs. 
 
Table 2 shows that CEO’s previous board experience for non-state-owned IPOs is 
significantly higher than state-owned IPOs. We also find that CEOs with 
Science/Engineering backgrounds are significantly higher for state-owned IPOs. Moreover, 
28.5% of the CEOs of non-state-owned IPOs have post-graduate qualifications compared 
with 22.1% for their state-owned counterparts. We also find that the proportion of politically 
connected CEOs is greater for state-owned IPOs. Interestingly, the proportion of female 
CEOs is higher (6%) for non-state-owned IPOs compared with 3% for state-owned IPOs.  
Furthermore, Table 2 also shows that, the proportion of CEOs with postgraduate degrees is 
significantly higher for the SZSE being 36% compared with the SSE at 18%. Moreover, 
CEOs board experience is greater in the SZSE as the proportions of CEOs with previous 
board memberships are 33% and 52% for the SSE and the SZSE respectively. Table 2 also 
shows that there is no significant difference between the proportions of female CEOs in either 
the SSE (4%) or the SZSE (5%). Finally, CEOs’ share ownership is greater in the SZSE (5%) 
compared with the SSE (0.5%). 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 presents the univariate analysis of the relationship between CEO demographic 
characteristics namely age, gender, education, board and professional experience and 
corporate risk- taking measures. We compare means based on median age (46 years) and 
tenure (3 years). The results show that there is a significant difference in both total risk and 
company specific risk between younger (77%) and older CEOs (65%). This suggests that 
younger CEOs are likely to make risky decisions compared with older CEOs.  
 
The results also show that there is a significant difference in corporate risk-taking measures 
with respect to CEO gender. The average total risk for female and male CEOs is 88% and 
69% respectively whereas the average company specific risk for female and male CEOs is 
79% and 62% respectively. Moreover, the average systematic risk for female and male CEOs 
is 0.6% and 0.4% respectively. This suggests that female CEOs are not risk averse compared 
with their male counterparts in China. Finally, we find that CEOs with previous board 
memberships are likely to make risky decisions. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. 
It is clear from Table 4 that there is no evidence of a multicollinearity problem as none of the 
correlations between the independent variables is significantly above 0.50.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the fixed effects regressions of the influence of CEOs’ 
demographic characteristics on corporate risk- taking measured by total risk, company 
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specific risk and systematic risk as presented in Panels A, B and C respectively. The findings 
presented in Table 5 show that there is a negative and significant (p value <5%) relationship 
between CEO age and both total risk and company specific risk as in panels A and B 
respectively. This suggests that older CEOs are more risk averse compared with younger 
CEOs. Therefore, younger CEOs are likely to make risky decisions. Our result is consistent 
with the upper echelons theory and the findings of Orens and Reheul (2013). Therefore, our 
first hypothesis is supported.  
 
We also find a negative and highly significant relationship (P value <1%) between CEO 
tenure and both total risk and company specific risk respectively. However, the relationship 
between CEO tenure and systematic risk is also negative but marginally significant as in 
Panel C.  This suggests that long tenured CEOs are less likely to consider risky decisions as 
they are internally focused and much less receptive to new business ideas compared with 
short-tenured CEOs. This result is consistent with Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) and 
Orens and Reheul (2013). We argue that longer-tenured CEOs might be more interested in 
the stability and efficiency of their companies and hence may not make some risky decisions. 
The above result supports our second hypothesis. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
The results also show that there is a positive and highly significant relationship (p value <1%) 
between CEO board experience measured by CEO previous board memberships and 
corporate risk- taking measures. Our result is also consistent with Koellinger (2008) and 
Orens and Reheul (2013) as board experience provides CEOs with broader perspectives, 
more openness to encourage innovative and risky ideas and hence they are likely to make 
risky decisions. Therefore, the above results support our third hypothesis.  
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On the other hand, the results show that there is no significant relationship between CEOs 
professional experience namely Science/Engineering, Law, or Accounting and Economics 
backgrounds and corporate risk- taking measures. However, we find a negative and 
marginally significant (P value <10%) relationship between CEOs with a Law background 
and systematic risk. Moreover, our results show that there is a negative and significant (P 
value <5%) relationship between politically connected CEOs and systematic risk. Therefore, 
we may reject the fourth hypothesis with respect to the influence of CEOs professional 
backgrounds on both total risk and company-specific risk. 
 
Our results also show that there is a highly significant and positive relationship between CEO 
higher education measured by CEOs who hold postgraduate degrees e.g. MSc, MBA and 
PhD, and corporate risk- taking. This result is consistent with Anderson et al (2011) and 
Orens and Reheul (2013) as they argue that different educational backgrounds may bring into 
the board different viewpoints, perspectives, cognitive paradigms, and different professional 
developments and this may encourage CEOs to make more risky decisions. Our result is also 
consistent with Beber and Fabbri (2012) as they find that overconfident directors with an 
MBA degree may take more risk. We argue that highly educated CEOs are less risk averse 
and are likely to be more open to innovative business ideas, and hence, they are better 
informed about their external environment. The above result supports our fifth hypothesis. 
 
Interestingly, we find a positive and highly significant (p value <1%) relationship between 
female CEOs and both total risk and company specific risk. This result is in contrast with the 
existing body of the literature which documents that female directors are more risk averse 
(Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Sunden and Surette 1998). However, our result is consistent 
with the recent studies of Berger et al (2012) and Adams and Funk (2012). They find that the 
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higher the proportion of female directors the more risk-taking. We argue that this result is 
consistent with human capital and resource dependence theories as female CEOs may bring 
to the board different viewpoints, perspectives, and different professional experiences and 
thus they may prefer to make more risky decisions. Based on the above results, we reject our 
sixth hypothesis.  
 
Table 5 also indicates that there is no significant relationship between CEO share ownership 
and corporate risk- taking. Kim and Lu (2011) find that a high level of CEOs’ ownership may 
discourage them from taking risk unless mitigated by strong external governance 
mechanisms. Furthermore, we find a positive and highly significant relationship between 
state share ownership and corporate risk- taking. The dominance of state ownership and 
control is one of the distinguishing features of the Chinese governance mechanism (Kato and 
Long 2006). Allen et al (2005) and Guariglia et al (2011) argue that there is preferential 
treatment to state-owned companies from financial institutions.  Farag and Mallin (2015) find 
that state-owned IPOs have better financial performance. We argue that CEOs of state-owned 
companies are motivated to make risky decisions given the preferential treatment from the 
financial sector and the state.   
As expected, we find a positive and highly significant relationship between financial 
performance measured by lagged ROA and corporate risk- taking. Moreover, consistent with 
Anderson and Fraser (2000), we find that larger companies are likely to have less total risk 
and company specific risk, though more systematic risk. Furthermore, we find a positive and 
significant relationship between both board size and independence and total risk and 
company specific risk respectively.  Therefore, large and more independent boards are overall 
likely to make risky decisions. Moreover, when directors link the company with its external 
environment, board size and independence may reduce company uncertainty (Hillman et al., 
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2000). Finally, the fixed effects models are well-specified as F-statistics are highly 
significant. 
 
Sun and Tong (2003) claim that the Chinese government still owns a majority of controlling 
shareholdings in listed companies, despite the economic reform and privatisation programme 
adopted by the state. This may have an impact on CEO discretion and thus corporate risk- 
taking (Li and Tang 2010). In this section we address the concerns that the influence of CEOs 
demographics is particularly driven by state ownership. Therefore, we present the fixed 
effects regressions for both state-owned and non-state-owned IPOs as in Table 6. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
We find consistent results with those presented in Table 5 with respect to the influence of 
CEO tenure, previous board experience, and professional experience in addition to CEO 
ownership on corporate risk- taking for both state-owned and non-state-owned IPOs. 
However, we notice that there is a negative and significant influence of CEO age on total risk 
and company specific risk for non-state- owned IPOs. Moreover, we find similar 
relationships - to those presented in Table 5- between both CEO gender and political 
connections and corporate risk- taking only for state-owned IPOs. With respect to CEO 
higher education, we find that there is a positive and significant relationship between CEO 
education and corporate risk- taking only for state-owned IPOs. Interestingly, we find that 
independent boards for non-state-owned IPOs are likely to make risky decisions; however, 
we find no impact of board size on total risk and company specific risk for both state-owned 
and non- state-owned IPOs.  To sum up, the results presented in Table 6 show that the 
determinants of corporate risk- taking behaviour do significantly vary between state-owned 
27 
 
and non-state-owned IPOs with respect to the impact of CEO demographic characteristics 
namely age, gender, and education. Younger CEOs in non- state-owned IPOs are likely to 
make risky decisions, whereas in state-owned IPOs, CEOs with post-graduate qualifications 
and female CEOs are less risk averse and likely to take more risk. Moreover, the greater the 
board independence the more risk-taking in non-state-owned IPOs.  
 
The results presented earlier in Table 2 show that there is a significant difference in CEOs 
demographics between both the SSE and SZSE. Table 7 presents the results of the fixed 
effects regressions of the influence of CEOs demographic characteristics on corporate risk- 
taking for IPOs listed in both SSE and SZSE as presented in Panels A and B respectively.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Overall we find similar results to those presented in Table 5. We find a negative relationship 
between CEO age and corporate risk-taking measured by total risk and company specific risk. 
However, this relationship is significant only in the SZSE. We also find a negative and 
significant link between CEOs tenure and both total risk and company specific risk. 
Moreover, we find a positive relationship between CEO previous board experience and 
corporate risk- taking; however, this relationship is more significant in the SSE. 
 
On the other hand, we find a significant and negative relationship between CEOs with 
Science/Engineering and Accounting/ Economics backgrounds and both total risk and 
company specific risk in the SSE. Furthermore, we find a significant and positive link 
between CEOs higher education and both total risk and company specific risk in the SZSE. 
Consistent with the results presented in Table 5, CEO share ownership has no influence on 
corporate risk- taking in both the SSE and the SZSE. However, we find a positive and 
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significant relationship between state-ownership and corporate risk- taking in both the SSE 
and the SZSE. Finally, the results show that female CEOs are not risk averse and are likely to 
make risky decisions in the SZSE. 
 
In this section, we present the results of a number of robustness tests. CEO turnover may 
have an impact on corporate risk- taking, therefore, we control for CEO turnover to address 
the concern of selection bias
10
 and re-estimate the fixed effects models. On the other hand, 
Roodman (2009) argue that fixed effects models may produce biased results due to their 
econometrics problems such as serial correlation (our measure of corporate risk-taking 
measures may suffer from serial correlation). Therefore, we estimate the system GMM as a 
robustness check. Table 8 presents the results of these robustness tests as in Panels A and B.  
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
Overall, the results presented in Panel A are similar to those of Table 5. However, we find 
that the coefficient on CEO turnover is statistically insignificant for corporate risk-taking 
measures. Therefore, there is no influence of CEO turnover on corporate risk –taking for 
Chinese IPOs. Moreover, the results presented in Panel B are consistent with the fixed effects 
estimation with regard to the CEO age, tenure, and CEO previous board experience. 
However, we find a negative and significant link between CEOs with Law backgrounds and 
both total risk and company specific risk. This result suggests that CEOs with Law 
background are less likely to make risky decisions.  
 
The results presented in Panel B also show a negative and highly significant relationship 
between politically connected CEOs and both total risk and company specific risk. We also 
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find similar results to those presented in Table 5 with respect to the influence of CEO gender 
and education on corporate risk-taking. Finally, the models are well specified as the Hansen 
test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions assumption and the results of the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) test for second order serial correlation is insignificant. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
The uncertainty about management quality is always a key issue for shareholders as stock 
markets continually reflect the assessments of CEOs’ characteristics, skills and their risk 
profiles into stock prices. China has an increasing influence on the world economy although 
it has different socio-economic and cultural frameworks compared with western countries. 
Therefore studying the Chinese experience in relation to the CEOs’ demographic 
characteristics and corporate risk- taking provides some unique insights and adds to the 
existing literature on corporate governance.  
 
Using a sample of 892 IPOs floated in both the SSE and the SZSE during 1999-2009, the 
univariate analysis shows that there is a significant difference in total risk and company 
specific risk between younger and older CEOs and this suggests that younger CEOs are likely 
to make risky decisions compared with older CEOs. We also find that there is a significant 
difference in corporate risk-taking between female and male CEOs. This result is consistent 
with Berger et al (2012) and Adams and Funk (2012) and suggests that female CEOs are not 
risk averse compared with male CEOs in China. The fixed effects and system GMM 
estimations show that there is a negative and significant relationship between CEO age and 
corporate risk-taking in China. This suggests that older CEOs are more risk averse compared 
with younger CEOs. Our result is consistent with the upper echelons theory. We also find a 
negative and highly significant relationship between CEO tenure and corporate risk-taking 
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suggesting that long-tenured CEOs  are less likely to consider risky decisions as they are 
internally focused and much less receptive to new business ideas compared with short-
tenured CEOs.  Moreover, longer-tenured CEOs might be more interested in the stability and 
efficiency of their companies and hence may not make risky decisions.  
 
Consistent with Koellinger (2008) and Orens and Reheul (2013), we find a highly significant 
and positive relationship between CEO previous board experience and corporate risk-taking 
as board experience provides CEOs with broader perspectives, better understanding to 
corporate culture and group dynamics (Anderson et al., 2011) and hence they are likely to 
make risky decisions. Our results also show that there is a highly significant and positive 
relationship between CEO higher education and corporate risk-taking. We argue that highly 
educated CEOs are less risk averse and are likely to be more open to innovative business 
ideas, and hence, they are better informed about their external environment. Interestingly, and 
consistent with the results with Berger et al (2012) and Adams and Funk (2012), we find that 
female CEOs are not risk averse.  We argue that female CEOs may bring to the board 
different viewpoints, different perspectives, and different professional experiences. Finally, 
we find a positive and highly significant relationship between state ownership and corporate 
risk-taking.  
 
This paper has a number of policy implications; we believe that studying the demographic 
characteristics of the Chinese IPOs may provide useful insights to policy makers and 
shareholders. Policy makers and shareholders generally seek to hire the most talented CEOs 
with the relevant set of skills to achieve shareholders’ objectives and improve the Chinese 
competitiveness in the global market. We argue that younger, short-tenured, and female 
CEOs and those with previous board experience and postgraduate qualifications are likely to 
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make risky decisions. Our empirical results provide support for the calls for broader board 
diversity in terms of age, gender, education and board experience. Furthermore, they provide 
support and encouragement for the recent recommendations to encourage board diversity as a 
feature of corporate governance best practice. An investigation of the impact of venture 
capital backed IPOs on CEO power, in addition to CEO compensation heterogeneity, are 
potential areas for future research. 
Endnotes
                                                          
1
 During 2010 and 2011, the IPO market also witnessed a sharp increase in terms of the number of IPOs (in the 
SZSE stock exchange in particular) as 345 and 278 IPOs were launched in the SSE and SZSE respectively. For 
more detail, see Ernst &Young, Global IPO Trends Report 2010-2012: Prepare early, move fast, 2012 and the 
websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.  
2 At the end of May 2013, 269 Chinese firms had withdrawn their IPO applications, while 666 firms had their 
IPO plans under review by the CSRC. 
3 According to the Chinese Company Law and its amended version in 2006, the general manager is responsible 
for “being in charge of managing the company's production and operation, and organizing the implementation 
of resolutions adopted by the board; organizing the implementation of annual operating plans and investment 
programs of the company; drafting the plan for the structure of the company's internal management; drafting 
the basic management scheme of the company; formulating detailed rules of the company; recommending for 
appointment or removal of the deputy general managers and the officer in charge of finance; appointing and 
removing officers of the company other than those to be appointed or removed by the board; other authorities 
prescribed by the articles of association and delegated by the board”.  
4
We could not find data on innovation, on CSMAR database and many missing data on R&D expenditure as 
alternative proxies for corporate risk- taking as not all IPOs invest in R&D. 
5
 According to the CSMAR database, there are other categories such as Academics. However, we used the 
classification of CEOs’ professional experience following Anderson et al (2011). 
6
 Agency theory provides the basis and the rationale for the board’s monitoring function on behalf of 
shareholders and entails that agents (the directors) are working in the best interests of shareholders. According 
to agency theory, executive share ownership may align long-term objectives of both shareholders and top 
executives. Therefore, share ownership may encourage CEOs and top executives to adopt wealth-enhancing 
objectives by making more risky decisions (Jensen 1993). 
7 We also run the Hausman test to decide between fixed or random effects. The test result rejects the null 
hypothesis that errors are not correlated with regressors. Therefore we conclude that the fixed effects model is 
preferred against the alternative random effects model.  
8 The system GMM allows for the use of lagged variables to control for endogeneity. It also assumes that the 
idiosyncratic error terms are heteroskedastic and serially correlated, and uncorrelated across companies 
(Roodman, 2009). 
9
 For more detail see  http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/200804/t20080418_14502.htm 
10
  We also excluded the observations where the company appoints a new CEO and re-estimate the fixed effects 
regressions. We find similar results to those presented in Table 5.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample 
 Mean SD Min Max Obs 
T. Risk 0.703 1.208 0.002 40.465 7943 
Unsys. Risk 0.635 1.158 0.000 40.465 7943 
Sys. Risk 0.067 0.236 0.000 11.958 7943 
CEO Age 46.672 6.701 24.000 77.000 7957 
CEO Tenure 3.332 1.692 1.000 20.000 7874 
CEO Exp. 0.406 0.491 0.000 1.000 8006 
Science/Engineering 0.367 0.482 0.000 1.000 8006 
Accounting/Economics 0.229 0.420 0.000 1.000 8006 
Law 0.008 0.090 0.000 1.000 8006 
PolconCEOs 0.061 0.076 0.000 1.000 8006 
CEO edu 0.252 0.434 0.000 1.000 8006 
Fem CEO 0.046 0.187 0.000 1.000 8006 
CEO/Chair 0.173 0.379 0.000 1.000 8006 
CEOOwn 0.022 0.076 0.000 0.691 7970 
StateOwn 0.216 0.266 0.000 0.863 7970 
ROA 0.068 0.089 -1.674 1.789 7906 
Tobin’s Q 1.786 1.188 0.464 15.929 7960 
Bsize 9.401 2.005 5.000 19.000 8006 
INED 0.328 0.102 0.000 0.801 7938 
Ln TA 21.480 1.239 17.272 28.405 7988 
Coage 9.632 4.189 1.000 25.000 8006 
Debt/TA 0.452 0.198 0.003 0.891 7987 
IA ratio 0.040 0.061 0.000 0.840 7981 
Exchange 0.585 0.493 0.000 1.000 7943 
T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for each company year. Daily stock 
returns are calculated as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two 
consecutive trading days adjusted for dividends, stock dividends, and stock splits. Unsys. Risk: 
Unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals of 
market model and market adjusted model for each company year. Sys. Risk: Systematic risk 
measured by the difference between total risk and firm- specific risk. We use both SSE and SZSE 
composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges respectively. CEOAge: CEO age measured by years; CEO Tenure: the length of time 
served on the current board; CEO Exp: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has previous 
board memberships and 0 otherwise; CEO Prof. Ex: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO 
has a background in Science/Engineering, Accounting/Economics and Law respectively and 0 
otherwise. PolconCEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 
0 otherwise; CEO edu: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. Masters and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise; Fem CEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO is female and 0 otherwise; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO and the 
Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise; CEOOwn: percentage of shares owned by CEOs; 
StateOwn: percentage of State share ownership; ROA: return on assets calculated as (net profits + 
financial expenses)/average total assets; Tobin’s Q: Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the 
book value of debt and the book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets); 
Bsize: board of directors’ size; INED: percentage of independent non-executive directors ;  lnTA: 
natural logarithm of company’s total assets as a proxy for company size; Coage: company age since 
its establishment year; Debt/TA: total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage; IA ratio: 
Intangible assets intensity ratio measured by the proportion of intangible assets to total assets; 
Exchange: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an IPO is floated in Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
0 for Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
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Table 2: CEO Demographics and Corporate Governance Characteristics for Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and for SOEs and non-SOEs 
 Shanghai  Shenzhen t- statistics SOEs Non SOEs t- statistics 
T. Risk 0.647 0.783 4.928
***
 0.767 0.635 -4.870
***
 
Unsys. Risk 0.539 0.771 8.829
***
 0.691 0.576 -4.399
***
 
Sys. Risk 0.107 0.011 -18.269
***
 0.758 0.058 -9.300
***
 
CEO Age 46.566 46.868 1.877
*
 46.722 46.617 -0.702 
CEO Tenure 3.246 3.452 5.351
***
 3.203 3.470 7.019
***
 
CEOExp. 0.329 0.515 16.994
***
 0.324 0.493 15.595
***
 
Science/Engineering 0.366 0.368 0.157 0.397 0.334 -5.829
***
 
Accounting/Economics 0.225 0.235 1.132 0.235 0.221 -1.481 
Law 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.168 
PolconCEO 0.071 0.041 -1.716
*
 0.097 0.023 -4.196
***
 
CEO edu 0.178 0.359 18.631
***
 0.221 0 .285 6.743*** 
Fem CEO 0.042 0.049 1.553 0.030 0.062 6.893
***
 
CEO/Chair 0.117 0.254 16.117
***
 0.116 0.235 14.211
***
 
CEOOwn 0.005 0.047 25.347
***
 0.005 0.039 20.839
***
 
ROA 0.062 0.075 6.357
***
 0.064 0.072 4.451
***
 
Tobin’s Q 1.710 1.892 6.729*** 1.502 2.088 22.693*** 
Bsize 9.679 9.163 -11.418
***
 9.895 9.000 -20.333
***
 
INED 0.325 0.333 10.417
***
 0.309 0.348 -17.305
***
 
Ln TA 21.688 21.20 -17.856
***
 21.550 21.405 -5.272
***
 
Coage 9.918 9.253 -7.000
***
 8.621 10.717 23.096
***
 
Debt/TA 0.479 0.408  -10.512
***
 0.463 0.436 -6.175
***
 
IA ratio 0.040 0.039 -0.722 0.035 0.044 6.199
***
 
The table presents univariate analysis of a comparison between CEO Demographics and Corporate Governance 
Characteristics for IPOs floated in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and for state owned companies 
(SOEs) and non-state owned companies (Non-SOEs) over the period 1999-2012 (sample period 1999-2009, with changes 
tracked until 2012). T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for each company year. Daily stock 
returns are calculated as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days 
adjusted for dividends, stock dividends, and stock splits. Unsys. Risk: unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as the 
annualized standard deviation of the residuals of market model and market adjusted model for each company year. Sys. 
Risk: systematic risk measured by the difference between total risk and company- specific risk. We use both SSE and 
SZSE composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
respectively. CEOAge: CEO age measured by years; CEO Tenure: the length of time served on the current board; CEO 
Exp: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has previous board memberships and 0 otherwise; CEO Prof. Ex: 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has a background in Science/Engineering, Accounting/Economics and 
Law respectively and 0 otherwise. PolconCEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected 
and 0 otherwise; CEO edu: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds a postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters 
and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise; Fem CEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise; 
CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO and the Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise; 
CEOOwn: percentage of shares owned by CEOs; ROA: return on assets calculated as (net profits + financial 
expenses)/average total assets; Tobin’s Q: Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the book value of debt and the 
book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets); Bsize: board of directors’ size; INED: percentage 
of independent non-executive directors ;  lnTA: natural logarithm of company’s total assets as a proxy for company size; 
Coage: company age since its establishment year; Debt/TA: total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage; IA ratio: 
Intangible assets intensity ratio measured by the proportion of intangible assets to total assets. *** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Univariate analysis of the relationship between CEO demographic 
characteristics and risk taking 
 
CEO characteristics 
Panel A: T. Risk Panel B: Unsys. 
Risk 
Panel C: Sys. Risk 
Mean t- stat Mean t- stat Mean t- stat 
CEO Age       
Age >= Median  0.645 
 -4.702
***
 
0.579 
-4.745
***
 
0.0041 
- 0.785 
Age <   Median 0.773 0.703 0.0045 
CEO Gender       
Male 0.689 
-2.959
***
 
0.623 
-2.728
***
 
.0041 
-1.917
* 
Female 0.879 0.792 .0057 
CEO Education       
PG degree 0.692 
0.605 
0.643 
0.593 
0.0030 
-0.088 
Non-PG degree 0.668 0.620 0.0031 
CEO Board Experience       
CEO Tenure       
Tenure >= Median 0.707 0.824 0.639 0.796 0.0043 0.495 
Tenure <    Median 0.675  0.611  0.0041  
CEOExp       
CEO previous directorship 0.736 
2.986
*** 
0.663 
2.536
** 
0.0046 
2.868
*** 
Non CEO previous directorship 0.654 0.595 0.0036 
The table presents the univariate analysis of the relationship between CEO demographic characteristics and 
corporate risk taking measured by stock returns volatility for a sample of Chinese IPOs during 1999-2012. The 
median of CEO age and tenure are 46 and 3 years respectively. T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily 
stock returns for each company year. Daily stock returns are calculated as the first difference in the natural 
logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days adjusted for dividends, stock dividends, and 
stock splits; Unsys. Risk: unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as the annualized standard deviation of the 
residuals of market model and market adjusted model for each company year. Sys. Risk: systematic risk 
measured by the difference between total risk and company- specific risk. We use both SSE and SZSE 
composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
respectively. ***, **,and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
 T.Risk Unsys. 
Risk 
Sys. 
Risk 
CEO 
Age 
CEO 
tenure 
CEO 
Exp. 
CEO 
edu 
CEO 
Own 
Bsize CEO/ 
Chair 
INED ROA State 
Own 
T.Risk 1.000             
Unsys. Risk 0.981 1.000            
Sys.Risk 0.302 0.111 1.000           
CEO Age -0.032 -0.032 -0.007 1.000          
CEO tenure -0.048 -0.046 -0.019 0.102 1.000         
CEO Exp. 0.034 0.028 0.032 0.107 0.075 1.000        
CEO edu 0.004 0.006 0.048 -0.088 0.037 0.169 1.000       
CEO Own 0.056 0.065 0.032 0.032 0.065 0.144 0.156 1.000      
Bsize 0.009 0.014 -0.023 0.079 0.002 -0.049 -0.031 -0.154 1.000     
CEO/Chair 0.052 0.062 -0.036 0.136 0.041 0.166 0.077 0.372 -0.144 1.000    
INED 0.191 0.185 -0.068 0.057 0.022 0.287 0.182 0.135 0.137 0.063 1.000   
ROA 0.078 0.080 0.007 0.038 0.036 0.057 0.051 0.096 0.036 0.040 -0.028 1.000  
State Own 0.054 0.046 0.046 0.021 -0.074 -0.208 -0.102 0.219 0.220 -0.169 0.162 -0.0001 1.000 
Ln TA -0.143 -0.152 0.038 0.187 0.077 0.159 0.100 -0.141 0.225 -0.124 0.130 0.090 0.089 
Fem CEO 0.035 0.032 -0.022 0.001 0.006 -0.006 0.007 -0.030 -0.085 0.009 -0.017 0.014 -0.065 
Coage 0.174 0.175 -0.029 0.120 0.059 0.187 0.037 -0.065 -0.053 -0.023 0.042 -0.071 -0.348 
PolconCEO -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.049 0.009 -0.026 0.024 -0.022 0.014 -0.004 0.016 -0.012 0.055 
Law 0.013 0.013 -0.006 -0.010 -0.011 -0.001 0.028 -0.015 0.010 -0.042 0.002 -0.002 -0.011 
Engineering -0.003 -0.009 -0.027 -0.038 0.015 -0.032 0.019 -0.015 0.035 -0.026 0.011 0.001 0.077 
Accounting -0.008 -0.005 0.019 0.072 0.005 0.011 -0.016 -0.033 -0.011 -0.001 -0.030 0.009 0.010 
Exchange -0.055 -0.099 0.201 -0.022 -0.060 0.187 -0.205 -0.274 0.127 0.178 0.126 -0.072 0.174 
IA ratio -0.051 -0.051 -0.010 0.039 0.012 0.060 0.029 -0.001 -0.029 -0.004 0.030 -0.043 -0.102 
Debt/TA 0.045 0.052 -0.026 0.075 -0.034 0.021 0.005 -0.125 0.127 -0.098 0.095 -0.051 0.105 
Tobin’s Q 0.021 0.031 0.043 0.002 0.002 0.078 0.035 0.073 -0.106  0.086 -0.025 0.162 -0.253 
 
 Ln TA Fem 
CEO 
Co 
age 
Polcon 
CEO 
Law Engineering Accounting Exchange IA ratio Debt/TA Tobin’s 
Q 
Ln TA 1.000           
Fem CEO -0.041 1.000          
Coage 0.221 0.018 1.000         
Polcon CEO 0.028 -0.017 -0.032 1.000        
Law 0.031 -0.020 0.027 -0.007 1.000       
Engineering 0.006 -0.057 -0.041 -0.058 -0.069 1.000      
Accounting -0.025 0.019 -0.006 -0.041 -0.049 0.414 1.000     
Exchange 0.197 -0.017 0.078 0.019 -0.0001 -0.002 -0.013 1.000    
IA ratio 0.038 -0.020 0.153 -0.001 0.061 -0.073 0.003 0.008 1.000   
Debt/TA 0.375 -0.003 0.135 0.049 -0.002 0.047 0.0002 0.142 0.007 1.000  
Tobin’s Q -0.234 0.037 0.128 -0.016 -0.003 -0.037 -0.036 -0.075 0.199 -0.161 1.000 
T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for each company year. Daily stock returns are calculated as the first 
difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days adjusted for dividends, stock dividends, and stock 
splits. Unsys. Risk: unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals of market model and 
market adjusted model for each company year. Sys. Risk: systematic risk measured by the difference between total risk and company- 
specific risk. We use both SSE and SZSE composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges respectively. CEOAge: CEO age measured by years; CEO Tenure: the length of time served on the current board; CEO Exp: 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has previous board memberships and 0 otherwise; CEO Prof. Ex: dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 if the CEO has a background in Science/Engineering, Accounting/Economics and Law respectively and 0 otherwise. 
PolconCEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; CEO edu: dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the CEO holds a postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise; Fem CEO: dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO and the Chair are the same person 
and 0 otherwise; CEOOwn: percentage of shares owned by CEOs; StateOwn: percentage of State share ownership; ROA: return on assets 
calculated as (net profits + financial expenses)/average total assets; Tobin’s Q: Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the book value 
of debt and the book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets); Bsize: board of directors’ size; INED: percentage 
of independent non-executive directors ;  lnTA: natural logarithm of company’s total assets as a proxy for company size; Coage: company 
age since its establishment year; Debt/TA: total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage; IA ratio: Intangible assets intensity ratio 
measured by the proportion of intangible assets to total assets; Exchange: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an IPO is floated in 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and 0 for Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Bold figures indicate significance at the 5% level or below.  
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Table 5: Fixed Effects regression of CEOs’ Characteristics on Corporate Risk Taking 
 Panel A: Total Risk Panel B: Unsys. Risk Panel C: Sys Risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CEO Age 
 
-0.002
** 
(0.001) 
-0.002
** 
(0.001) 
-0.002
** 
(0.001) 
-0.002
** 
(0.001) 
-0.0001
 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001
 
(0.0001) 
CEO Tenure 
-0.018
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.0005
* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005
* 
(0.0003) 
CEOExp. 
0.066
*** 
(0.019) 
0.067
*** 
(0.019) 
0.061
*** 
(0.019) 
0.062
*** 
(0.018) 
0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
Science/Engineering 
-0.029
 
(0.024) 
-0.033
 
(0.024) 
-0.028
 
(0.024) 
-0.033
 
(0.023) 
-0.001
 
(0.002) 
-0.0002
 
(0.002) 
Law 
0.017
 
(0.102) 
0.021
 
(0.101) 
0.031
 
(0.101) 
0.032 
(0.101) 
-0.014
* 
(0.008) 
-0.014
* 
(0.008) 
Accounting/Economics 
-0.024
 
(0.026) 
-0.028
 
(0.026) 
-0.024
 
(0.026) 
-0.029
 
(0.026) 
0.001
 
(0.002) 
0.001
 
(0.002) 
PolconCEO 
-0.034
 
(0.117) 
-0.034
 
(0.117) 
-0.015
 
(0.116) 
-0.015
 
(0.116) 
-0.018
** 
(0.009) 
-0.017
** 
(0.008) 
CEOedu 
0.058
*** 
(0.022) 
0.064
*** 
(0.022) 
0.049
** 
(0.022) 
0.055
** 
(0.022) 
0.009
*** 
(0.001) 
0.008
*** 
(0.001) 
Fem CEO 
0.267
*** 
(0.049) 
0.282
*** 
(0.049) 
0.271
*** 
(0.049) 
0.285
*** 
(0.049) 
-0.003
 
(0.004) 
-0.003
 
(0.003) 
L.CEOOwn 
0.017
 
(0.221) 
0.032
 
(0.221) 
0.012
 
(0.219) 
0.025
 
(0.219) 
0.006
 
(0.018) 
0.006
 
(0.017) 
L.State Own 
0.163
*** 
(0.044) 
0.162
*** 
(0.042) 
0.148
*** 
(0.043) 
0.145
*** 
(0.043) 
0.015
*** 
(0.003) 
0.017
*** 
(0.003) 
L.ROA 
0.639
*** 
(0.091) 
 
0.606
*** 
(0.090) 
 
0.033
*** 
(0.007) 
 
L.Tobin’s Q  
0.006
 
(0.005) 
 
0.003
 
(0.005) 
 0.004
*** 
(0.0004) 
L.ln Bsize 
0.103
** 
(0.052) 
0.108
** 
(0.052) 
0.111
** 
(0.053) 
0.113
** 
(0.051) 
-0.008
 
(0.006) 
-0.005
 
(0.004) 
CEO/Chair 
0.066
** 
(0.027) 
0.066
** 
(0.027) 
0.070
*** 
(0.027) 
0.071
*** 
(0.027) 
-0.004
** 
(0.002) 
-0.004
** 
(0.002) 
L.INED 
0.273
*** 
(0.097) 
0.274
*** 
(0.097) 
0.325
*** 
(0.096) 
0.305
*** 
(0.097) 
-0.053
 
(0.071) 
-0.032
 
(0.073) 
L.ln TA 
-0.049
*** 
(0.017) 
-0.025
* 
(0.014) 
-0.055
*** 
(0.017) 
-0.032
** 
(0.015) 
0.006
*** 
(0.001) 
0.007
*** 
(0.001) 
Coage 
0.004
 
(0.006) 
-0.001
 
(0.006) 
0.004
 
(0.006) 
-0.002
 
(0.006) 
-0.0003
 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002
 
(0.0005) 
L. Debt/TA 
0.223
*** 
(0.069) 
0.137
** 
(0.066) 
0.240
*** 
(0.068) 
0.154
** 
(0.067) 
-0.017
*** 
(0.005) 
-0.018
*** 
(0.005) 
L.IA ratio 
-0.101
 
(0.162) 
-0.125
 
(0.161) 
-0.103
 
(0.161) 
-0.127
 
(0.160) 
-0.0003
 
(0.013) 
-0.001
 
(0.013) 
Cons. 
1.106
***
 
(0.365) 
0.669
*
 
(0.359) 
1.126
***
 
(0.363) 
0.745
**
 
(0.357) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
-0.096
***
 
(0.029) 
Company Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy No No No No No No 
R-sq 0.042 0.033 0.041 0.032 0.082 0.072 
F-stat 8.93
***
 6.68
***
 8.02
***
 6.39
***
 13.72
***
 15.08
***
 
# obs 6685 6753 6685 6753 6685 6753 
T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for each company year. Daily stock returns are 
calculated as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days 
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adjusted for dividends, stock dividends, and stock splits. Unsys. Risk: unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as 
the annualized standard deviation of the residuals of market model and market adjusted model for each company 
year. Sys. Risk: systematic risk measured by the difference between total risk and company- specific risk. We use 
both SSE and SZSE composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges respectively. CEOAge: CEO age measured by years; CEO Tenure: the length of time served on the 
current board; CEO Exp: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has previous board memberships and 0 
otherwise; CEO Prof. Ex: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has a background in Science/Engineering, 
Accounting/Economics and Law respectively and 0 otherwise. PolconCEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if 
the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; CEO edu: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds a 
postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise; Fem CEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if 
the CEO is female and 0 otherwise; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO and the Chair are 
the same person and 0 otherwise; L.CEOOwn: lagged percentage of shares owned by CEOs; L.StateOwn: lagged 
percentage of State share ownership; ; L.ROA: lagged return on assets calculated as (net profits + financial 
expenses)/average total assets; L.Tobin’s Q: lagged Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the book value of 
debt and the book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets) as a proxy for growth 
opportunities; L.lnBsize: natural logarithm of lagged board of directors’ size; L.INED: lagged percentage of 
independent non-executive directors ;  L.lnTA: natural logarithm of lagged company’s total assets as a proxy for 
company size; Coage: company age since its establishment year; L.Debt/TA: lagged total debt to total assets ratio as 
a proxy for leverage; L.IA ratio: lagged intangible assets intensity ratio measured by the proportion of intangible 
assets to total assets.. ***, **,and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust 
standard errors are presented between parentheses.   
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Table 6: Fixed Effects regressions for State-Owned vs Non-State-Owned Companies  
 Panel A:State-Owned Companies Panel B:Non- State-Owned Companies 
 T. Risk  Unsys. Risk  Sys. Risk  T. Risk Unsys. Risk Sys. Risk 
CEO Age -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.00001 
(0.0002) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
CEO Tenure -0.028
**
    
(0.011) 
-0.027
**
    
(0.011) 
-0.001    
(0.001) 
-0.010
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.009
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
CEOExp. 0.068
*
 
(0.041) 
0.067
*
 
(0.040) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.026
***
 
(0.008) 
0.023
***
 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Science/Engineering -0.040 
(0.050) 
-0.040 
(0.050) 
0.00003 
(0.003) 
-0.025
*
 
(0.014) 
-0.021
*
 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Law -0.085 
(0.231) 
-0.064 
(0.230) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
0.048 
(0.041) 
0.057 
(0.039) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
Accounting/ Economics -0.038    
(0.056) 
-0.034    
(0.056) 
-0.004    
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
PolconCEO  -0.053 
(0.193) 
-0.028 
(0.193) 
-0.025
**
 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.088) 
0.035 
(0.083) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
CEOedu  0.118
**
 
(0.047) 
0.107
**
 
(0.046) 
0.010
***
 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
0.005
*
 
(0.003) 
Fem CEO 0.728
***
 
(0.112) 
0.734
***
 
(0.112) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
L.CEOOwn 0.851 
(2.165) 
0.778 
(2.160) 
0.075 
(0.136) 
0.058 
(0.063) 
0.054 
(0.060) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
L.ROA 1.293
***
 
(0.180) 
1.251
***
 
(0.179) 
0.042
***
 
(0.011) 
0.076
**
 
(0.037) 
0.043 
(0.037) 
0.032
***
 
(0.010) 
L.ln Bsize 0.134 
(0.108) 
0.147 
(0.108) 
-0.014
**
 
(0.007) 
0.034 
(0.027) 
0.034 
(0.025) 
-0.0001 
(0.007) 
CEO/Chair 0.199
***
 
(0.071) 
0.207
***
 
(0.071) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.0005 
(0.003) 
L.INED -0.084 
(0.186) 
0.025 
(0.185) 
-0.110
***
 
(0.012) 
0.500
***
 
(0.050) 
0.494
***
 
(0.047) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
L.ln TA -0.077
**
 
(0.038) 
-0.080
**
 
(0.038) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.035
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.038
***
 
(0.008) 
0.004
**
 
(0.002) 
Coage 0.024 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.015
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.013
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
L.Debt/TA 0.207 
(0.151) 
0.217 
(0.150) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
0.204
***
 
(0.031) 
0.227
***
 
(0.029) 
-0.022
***
 
(0.008) 
L.IA ratio -0.276 
(0.354) 
-0.256 
(0.353) 
-0.023 
(0.022) 
0.078 
(0.092) 
0.053 
(0.087) 
0.025 
(0.024) 
Cons 1.530
*
 
(0.800) 
1.490
*
 
(0.798) 
0.042 
(0.051) 
1.127
***
 
(0.177) 
1.129
***
 
(0.167) 
0.003 
(0.045) 
Company Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy No No No No No No 
R-sq  0.084 0.081 0.112 0.114 0.150 0.071  
F-stat 8.44
***
 8.09
***
 11.63
***
 15.19
***
 15.12
***
 6.65
***
  
# obs 3320 3320 3320 3365 3365 3365  
T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for each company year. Daily stock returns are calculated as 
the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days adjusted for dividends, 
stock dividends, and stock splits. Unsys. Risk: unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as the annualized standard 
deviation of the residuals of market model and market adjusted model for each company year. Sys. Risk: systematic risk 
measured by the difference between total risk and company- specific risk. We use both SSE and SZSE composite market-
value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges respectively. CEOAge: CEO age 
measured by years; CEO Tenure: the length of time served on the current board; CEO Exp: dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 if the CEO has previous board memberships and 0 otherwise; CEO Prof. Ex: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the 
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CEO has a background in Science/Engineering, Accounting/Economics and Law respectively and 0 otherwise. PolconCEO: 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; CEO edu: dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 if the CEO holds a postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise; Fem CEO: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO and the Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise; L.CEOOwn: lagged percentage of shares owned by CEOs; 
L.ROA: lagged return on assets calculated as (net profits + financial expenses)/average total assets; L.lnBsize: natural 
logarithm of lagged board of directors’ size; L.INED: lagged percentage of independent non-executive directors ;  L.lnTA: 
natural logarithm of lagged company’s total assets as a proxy for company size; Coage: company age since its establishment 
year; L.Debt/TA: lagged total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage; L.IA ratio: lagged intangible assets intensity 
ratio measured by the proportion of intangible assets to total assets.. ***, **,and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are presented between parentheses.   
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Table 7: Fixed Effects regressions for Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
 Panel A:Shanghai Stock Exchange Panel B:Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 T. Risk Unsys. Risk Sys. Risk T. Risk Unsys. Risk Sys. Risk 
CEO Age -0.0002 
(0.0006) 
0.0001 
(0.0006) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.007
**
 
(0.003) 
-0.007
**
 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
CEO Tenure -0.005
** 
(0.002) 
-0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.025
**
 
(0.011) 
-0.025
**
 
(0.010) 
-0.00004 
(0.00003) 
CEOExp. 0.035
***
 
(0.008) 
0.027
***
 
(0.008) 
0.008
***
 
(0.002) 
0.074
*
 
(0.044) 
0.072
*
 
(0.043) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Science/Engineering -0.021
**
 
(0.010) 
-0.019
**
 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.064 
(0.065) 
-0.069 
(0.066) 
-0.0004
***
 
(0.0001) 
Law 0.0002 
(0.042) 
0.020 
(0.039) 
-0.021
*
 
(0.012) 
0.052 
(0.278) 
0.053 
(0.279) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
Accounting/ Economics -0.019
*
 
(0.011) 
-0.018
*
 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.031 
(0.074) 
-0.030 
(0.076) 
-0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
PolconCEO -0.018 
(0.045) 
0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.024
**
 
(0.012) 
0.047 
(0.416) 
0.049 
(0.417) 
-0.0003 
(0.0007) 
CEOedu 0.009 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.015
***
 
(0.002) 
0.099
**
 
(0.050) 
0.099
**
 
(0.049) 
-0.0004 
(0.0006) 
Fem CEO -0.022 
(0.021) 
-0.018 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.827
***
 
(0.131) 
0.824
***
 
(0.132) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
L.CEOOwn -0.355 
(0.217) 
-0.374 
(0.229) 
0.019 
(0.068) 
0.059 
(0.357) 
0.058 
(0.357) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
L.State Own 0.116
***
 
(0.018) 
0.093
***
 
(0.017) 
0.023
***
 
(0.005) 
0.403
***
 
(0.128) 
0.402
***
 
(0.123) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
L.ROA 0.121
***
 
(0.040) 
0.066
*
 
(0.037) 
0.055
***
 
(0.011) 
1.395
***
 
(0.222) 
1.391
***
 
(0.219) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
L.ln Bsize -0.015 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
0.316
**
 
(0.132) 
0.318
**
 
(0.131) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
CEO/Chair 0.015 
(0.012) 
0.022
**
 
(0.011) 
-0.077
***
 
(0.012) 
0.177
***
 
(0.066) 
0.175
***
 
(0.064) 
0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
L.INED 0.268
***
 
(0.043) 
0.344
***
 
(0.040) 
-0.018
***
 
(0.006) 
0.048 
(0.245) 
0.045 
(0.246) 
-0.001
**
 
(0.0004) 
L.ln TA -0.042
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.051
***
 
(0.006) 
0.008
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.045 
(0.047) 
-0.046 
(0.043) 
0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
Coage 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005
*
 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
L.Debt/TA 0.113
***
 
(0.029) 
0.138
***
 
(0.027) 
-0.025
***
 
(0.008) 
0.372
** 
(0.183) 
0.374
**
 
(0.182) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
L.IA ratio 0.013 
(0.062) 
0.020 
(0.057) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.488 
(0.596) 
-0.487 
(0.582) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
Cons 1.154
***
 
(0.155) 
1.168
***
 
(0.143) 
-0.014 
(0.045) 
0.526 
(0.992) 
-0.519 
(0.992) 
0.006
***
 
(0.002) 
Company Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy No No No No No No 
R-sq 0.255 0.366 0.101 0.074 0.073 0.039  
F-stat 9.02
***
 25.42
***
 13.22
***
 5.92
***
 5.90
*** 3.06***  
# obs 3976 3976 3976 2709 2709 2709  
T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for each company year. Daily stock returns are calculated as 
the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days adjusted for dividends, 
stock dividends, and stock splits. Unsys. Risk: unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as the annualized standard 
deviation of the residuals of market model and market adjusted model for each company year. Sys. Risk: systematic risk 
measured by the difference between total risk and company- specific risk. We use both SSE and SZSE composite market-
value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges respectively. CEOAge: CEO age 
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measured by years; CEO Tenure: the length of time served on the current board; CEO Exp: dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the CEO has previous board memberships and 0 otherwise; CEO Prof. Ex: dummy variable takes the value of 
1 if the CEO has a background in Science/Engineering, Accounting/Economics and Law respectively and 0 otherwise. 
PolconCEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; CEO edu: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds a postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise; Fem 
CEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the CEO and the Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise; L.CEOOwn: lagged percentage of shares owned 
by CEOs; L.StateOwn: lagged percentage of State share ownership; ; L.ROA: lagged return on assets calculated as (net 
profits + financial expenses)/average total assets; L.Tobin’s Q: lagged Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the 
book value of debt and the book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets) as a proxy for growth 
opportunities; L.lnBsize: natural logarithm of lagged board of directors’ size; L.INED: lagged percentage of independent 
non-executive directors ;  L.lnTA: natural logarithm of lagged company’s total assets as a proxy for company size; Coage: 
company age since its establishment year; L.Debt/TA: lagged total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage; L.IA 
ratio: lagged intangible assets intensity ratio measured by the proportion of intangible assets to total assets.. ***, **,and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are presented between 
parentheses.   
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Table 8: Robustness Tests 
 Panel A: Fixed Effects  Panel B: System GMM 
 Total Risk  Unsys. Risk Sys. Risk Total Risk  Unsys. Risk Sys. Risk 
L.T. Risk 
   0.466
***
 
(0.066) 
 
 
L.Unsys. Risk 
   
 
0.433
***
 
(0.008) 
 
L.Sys. Risk 
   
  
0.541
***
 
(0.105) 
CEOturnover 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
  
 
CEO Age 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.001
***
 
(0.0002) 
-0.001
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
CEO Tenure 
-0.016
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.017
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.0005
*
 
(0.0003) 
-0.006
***
 
(0.0007) 
-0.007
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.005
***
 
(0.001) 
CEOExp. 
0.066
***
 
(0.019) 
0.062
***
 
(0.019) 
0.005
***
 
(0.001) 
0.094
***
 
(0.002) 
0.098
***
 
(0.003) 
0.027
***
 
(0.007) 
Science/Engineering 
-0.028 
(0.024) 
-0.027 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.009
**
 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Law 
0.018 
(0.101) 
0.032 
(0.101) 
-0.014
*
 
(0.008) 
-0.048
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.025
**
 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Accounting/Economics 
-0.023 
(0.026) 
-0.023 
(0.026) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.012
***
 
(0.004)
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
PolconCEO 
-0.034 
(0.117) 
-0.015 
(0.116) 
-0.018
**
 
(0.009) 
-0.174
***
 
(0.023) 
-0.122
***
 
(0.024) 
0.041 
(0.055) 
CEO edu 
0.058
***
 
(0.022) 
0.049
**
 
(0.022) 
0.009
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.003) 
0.016
***
 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Fem CEO 
0.268
***
 
(0.049) 
0.271
***
 
(0.049) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.021
***
 
(0.007) 
0.036
***
 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.018) 
CEO Own 
0.013 
(0.221) 
0.007 
(0.219) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.235
*
 
(0.142) 
0.017 
(0.065) 
-0.029 
(0.084) 
State Own 
0.163
***
 
(0.044) 
0.148
***
 
(0.043) 
0.014
***
 
(0.003) 
0.162
***
 
(0.005) 
0.112
***
 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
ROA 
0.643
***
 
(0.091) 
0.610
***
 
(0.091) 
0.032
***
 
(0.007) 
0.126
***
 
(0.014) 
0.129
***
 
(0.016) 
0.180
**
 
(0.072) 
CEO/Chair 
0.067
**
 
(0.027) 
0.071
***
 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
lnBsize 
0.103
**
 
(0.052) 
0.111
**
 
(0.053) 
-0.008
**
 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.028 
(0.022) 
INED 
0.275
***
 
(0.097) 
0.327
***
 
(0.096) 
-0.053
***
 
(0.007) 
0.341
***
 
(0.014) 
0.428
***
 
(0.019) 
-0.207
***
 
(0.048) 
Ln TA 
-0.049
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.055
***
 
(0.017) 
0.006
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.024
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.025
***
 
(0.002) 
0.009
***
 
(0.002) 
Coage 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.001 
(0.0008) 
0.0003 
(0.0009) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
Debt/TA 
0.224
***
 
(0.069) 
0.241
***
 
(0.068) 
-0.017
***
 
(0.005) 
0.253
***
 
(0.012) 
0.216
***
 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
IA ratio 
-0.101 
(0.162) 
-0.103 
(0.161) 
-0.0002 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.023) 
-0.037 
(0.023) 
Cons 
1.098
***
 
(0.365) 
1.119
***
 
(0.363) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
0.416
***
 
(0.044) 
0.497
***
 
(0.047) 
0.033 
(0.057) 
Obs 6685 6685 6685 6792 6792 6792 
Company Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy No No No Yes Yes Yes 
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Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.042 0.040 0.066    
F-stat 8.14 7.79 13.28    
Wald test    p.value    0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-bond test for 
AR(1) p.value 
   0.003 0.004 0.000 
Arellano-bond test for 
AR(2) p.value 
   0.194 0.175 0.211 
Hansen test  p.value    0.497 0.519 0.183 
T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for each company year. Daily stock returns are calculated 
as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days adjusted for 
dividends, stock dividends, and stock splits. Unsys. Risk: unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as the annualized 
standard deviation of the residuals of market model and market adjusted model for each company year. Sys. Risk: 
systematic risk measured by the difference between total risk and company- specific risk. We use both SSE and SZSE 
composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges respectively. 
CEOturnover: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the company has a new CEO and 0 otherwise; CEOAge: CEO age 
measured by years; CEO Tenure: the length of time served on the current board; CEO Exp: dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the CEO has previous board memberships and 0 otherwise; CEO Prof. Ex: dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 if the CEO has a background in Science/Engineering, Accounting/Economics and Law respectively and 0 
otherwise. PolconCEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; CEO 
edu: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds a postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters and/or PhD) and 0 
otherwise; Fem CEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise; CEO/Chair: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO and the Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise; CEOOwn: percentage of 
shares owned by CEOs; StateOwn: percentage of State share ownership; ROA: return on assets calculated as (net profits 
+ financial expenses)/average total assets; Tobin’s Q: Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the book value of 
debt and the book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets); Bsize: board of directors’ size; 
INED: percentage of independent non-executive directors ;  lnTA: natural logarithm of company’s total assets as a 
proxy for company size; Coage: company age since its establishment year; Debt/TA: total debt to total assets ratio as a 
proxy for leverage; IA ratio: Intangible assets intensity ratio measured by the proportion of intangible assets to total 
assets;. ***, **,and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are 
presented between parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
